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I.      INTRODUCTION 
For the past twenty-seven years, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit has interpreted the federal patent venue statute quite 
liberally, with the result being that large companies accused of patent 
infringement can be sued in virtually any federal district court.1  The U.S. 
Supreme Court, which previously construed the very same venue statute 
                                                                                                             
 *  Chief Counsel of Washington Legal Foundation (“WLF”), a nonprofit, public-interest 
law firm located in Washington, D.C. The views expressed herein are his own. Mr. Samp 
is a graduate of Harvard College and the University of Michigan Law School. 
1 See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991). 
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far more narrowly,2 has agreed to review the issue once again,3 and it will 
render its decision by this June. 
The issue of patent venue has received increased attention in recent 
years, mostly due to the emergence of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Texas as the go-to district for patent holders seeking 
a fast-moving and patent-friendly court.4  However, companies that do not 
maintain a regular place of business in that largely rural section of Texas 
question why it is appropriate that they can be hauled into the Eastern 
District to answer on a nationwide basis for allegedly infringing activity.  
On the other hand, some patent holders worry that if the Supreme Court 
overturns the Federal Circuit, they may face increased difficulty in finding 
a convenient forum for raising all of their claims against an alleged 
infringer. 
While the proper construction of the patent venue statute5 will be the 
principal focus of the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland LLC v. 
Kraft Foods Group Brands, lurking in the background is the Court’s recent 
increased interest in the enforcement of due process limits on courts’ 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.6  Allowing 
a court in Marshall, Texas to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign (i.e., non-
Texas) corporation based on allegedly infringing activity that occurred 
outside the State raises as many personal-jurisdiction concerns as venue 
concerns.  The Court may well construe the patent venue statute narrowly 
as a means of avoiding the difficult constitutional issues that would arise 
if venue rules permitted companies that operate on a nationwide basis to 
be sued in any federal district in which they sell their products. 
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the relevant federal statutes and 
how they have been construed by the Federal Circuit.  Part III outlines the 
evolution of venue rules governing federal-court patent litigation over the 
past 125 years, as well as the evolution of limits on personal jurisdiction 
during that same period.  Part IV explains why current rules—under which 
a patentee may sue a defendant for all of its allegedly infringing activity 
in any district in which any infringing sales occur—raise serious due 
process concerns.  This Article concludes with the acknowledgement that 
                                                                                                             
2 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957). 
3 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 614 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2016) (No. 16-341). 
4 In 2015, 44% of all patent infringement lawsuits filed nationwide were filed in the 
Eastern District of Texas. Brian Howard, Lex Machina 2015 End-of-Year Trends (Jan. 7, 
2016). 
5 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
6 See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). The Court has scheduled 
oral argument on April 25, 2017 in two pending cases that raise important personal 
jurisdiction issues: Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, Case No. 16-466; and 
BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, Case No. 16-405.  
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some patent owners may have legitimate concerns over the Fourco venue 
rules’ potential for creating serious difficulties.  These concerns should be 
addressed to Congress, which has promised to revisit the issue regardless 
how the Court rules in TC Heartland. 
II.     WHERE DOES A CORPORATION “RESIDE” FOR VENUE 
PURPOSES? 
In 1897, Congress first enacted a “special” patent venue statute only 
applicable to patent-infringement litigation.  The current version, adopted 
in 1948, states in its entirety: “Any civil action for patent infringement 
may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or 
where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular 
and established place of business.”7 
TC Heartland boils down to a dispute over the meaning of the word 
“resides,” as used in § 1400(b).  In 1957, the Supreme Court held that a 
corporation being sued for patent infringement “resides” solely in one 
place: the State in which it is incorporated.8  In 1990, the Federal Circuit 
ruled that the word “resides” should be read far more broadly; it concluded 
that a corporation “resides,” for patent venue purposes, in any judicial 
district in which it “is subject to personal jurisdiction.”9  The Federal 
Circuit based its broadened reading of “resides” on Congress’s 1988 
adoption of a technical amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), a subsection 
within the general venue statute.10  The Federal Circuit concluded that 
Congress intended to “redefine[ ] the meaning of the term ‘resides’ in 
[§ 1400(b)].”11  It held that after 1988, § 1400(b) incorporated the revised 
§ 1391(c)’s broad understanding of where a corporation should “be 
                                                                                                             
7 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). Patents are issued by the federal government, and litigation 
regarding whether a patent is valid and infringed is heard exclusively in the federal courts. 
Section 1400(b)’s reference to “judicial district” is a reference to the district in which a 
federal district court is located. 
8 Fourco, 353 U.S. at 226. As interpreted by Fourco, § 1400(b) authorized venue in a 
judicial district: (1) in a corporate defendant’s State of incorporation; or (2) in which it 
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business. 
9 VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1578, 1584. 
10 The amendment slightly revised 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which after 1988 read as 
follows: “For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall 
be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at 
the time the action is commenced.” Section 1391(c) was revised again in 2011 and 
currently states: “Residency.—For all venue purposes— . . . (2) an entity with the capacity 
to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, 
shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is 
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 
11 VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1578. 
48 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:45 
deemed to reside”12—that is, a corporation “resides” wherever it “is 
subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 
Soon thereafter, the Federal Circuit addressed the question left open 
by VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.13: in which judicial 
districts is a corporate defendant “subject to personal jurisdiction?”  The 
Federal Circuit ruled in Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp.14 
that a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in a federal district in 
any State in which its allegedly infringing product is sold.  Moreover, it 
concluded that the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction with 
respect to all allegedly infringing sales, not simply those sales that 
occurred in the forum State.15  The appeals court determined that by 
permitting a district court to exercise jurisdiction on a nationwide basis, 
“these other states will thus be spared the burden of providing a forum for 
[the plaintiff] for these sales.  And defendants will be protected from 
harassment resulting from multiple suits.”16 
As a result of the Federal Circuit’s VE Holding and Beverly Hills Fan 
decisions, corporate defendants that sell products on a nationwide basis 
can be sued in federal district court anywhere in the United States. TC 
Heartland, the defendant in the case at issue in this Article, sells no more 
than 2% of its allegedly infringing product in Delaware and maintains no 
established place of business there.  Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the Delaware federal district court’s decision to invoke the 
Delaware long-arm statute to exercise personal jurisdiction over TC 
Heartland with respect to all allegedly infringing activity—even the 98% 
of such activity that bore no relationship to Delaware—was consistent 
with constraints imposed on courts by the Due Process Clause.17 
                                                                                                             
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1274. 
14 Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
The court imposed one caveat: personal jurisdiction was proper only if the forum State’s 
long-arm statute also authorized courts to exercise jurisdiction over the corporation. Id. at 
1569. But that caveat has little practical significance, given that the long-arm statutes of 
virtually all States permit their courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants to the full extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
15 Id. at 1568. 
16 Id. 
17 In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1343-45 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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III.     A BRIEF HISTORY OF PATENT VENUE AND PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION 
A.  Patent Litigation Through 1970 
Congress adopted a “special” patent venue statute, the predecessor of 
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), in 1897.18  This statute (referred to herein as § 48) 
stated that venue for patent-infringement actions existed “in the district of 
which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the 
defendant, whether a person, partnership, or corporation, shall have 
committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established place 
of business.”19  As the Supreme Court concluded in its 1942 decision in 
Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., Congress adopted the statute in 
order to “limit th[e] jurisdiction” of federal district courts over patent-
infringement actions.20  The Court explained that Congress was 
responding to “abuses engendered by extensive venue” authorized by 
previous statutes governing federal courts; these statutes had permitted 
actions (including patent-infringement actions) to be maintained 
“wherever the defendant could be found.”21 
A decade earlier, in 1887, Congress had adopted a statute that sought 
to impose general limits on venue, but courts construing the statute 
expressed uncertainty regarding whether those limitations applied to 
patent-infringement suits.22  Thereafter, Congress adopted the Act of 1897, 
which contained § 48, a provision solely focusing on venue in patent 
litigation.23  Congress’s purpose in doing so was to “eliminate [that] 
uncertainty” by “defin[ing] the exact jurisdiction of the federal courts in 
actions to enforce patent rights.”24  The Stonite Court concluded that this 
“purpose indicates that Congress did not intend the Act of 1897 to dovetail 
with the general provisions relating to the venue in civil suits, but rather 
that it alone should control venue in patent infringement proceedings.”25 
Congress’s 1897 adoption of § 48 occurred in an era when the 
authority of courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over those not living 
in the forum State was more limited than it is today.  In 1877, the Supreme 
Court in Pennoyer v. Neff held that state courts could exercise in personam 
jurisdiction over a nonresident only by effecting personal service of 
                                                                                                             
18 See Act of March 3, 1897, c. 395, 29 Stat. 695. 
19 In 1911, the patent venue statute was codified as Section 48 of the Judicial Code, 28 
U.S.C. § 109 (1940). 
20 Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 565 n.1 (1942). 
21 Id. at 563. 
22 Id. at 564. 
23 Id. at 565. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 565-66. 
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process within the State; service in another State or by publication within 
the State was insufficient.26  Accordingly, in the Nineteenth Century, it 
was often very difficult to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
outside its home State, even if the defendant conducted business in other 
States. 
However, the one exception permitted by Pennoyer—personal service 
of process on a non-resident defendant while the defendant happened to 
be located in the forum State—led to widespread confusion when the 
defendant was a corporation.  Courts had to grapple with the issue of when 
a nonresident corporation should be deemed physically present in a State. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Stonite, the issue was particularly difficult 
in patent infringement litigation because many pre-1897 court decisions 
interpreted federal venue statutes as permitting infringement suits to be 
filed “wherever the defendant could be found,” and such an interpretation 
led to “abuses.”27 
Section 48, the “special” patent venue statute, eliminated this 
confusion.  In fact, it did so in a manner that was reasonably favorable to 
plaintiffs when compared to other, contemporaneous venue provisions.  
The statute authorized venue not only in the defendant’s home jurisdiction, 
but also in any federal judicial district in which the alleged infringer “shall 
have committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established 
place of business.”28  Venue in other types of actions was more limited; 
for example, in diversity-jurisdiction cases, Congress prescribed that 
venue was proper only in a judicial district in which either the plaintiff or 
the defendant resided.29 
The patent venue rules established in 1897 did not change throughout 
most of the Twentieth Century.  The Supreme Court affirmed those rules 
in 1942 (Stonite) and 1957 (Fourco), rejecting efforts to liberalize venue 
restrictions.30 
B.  Patent Litigation in Recent Decades 
While patent venue rules remained the same, Twentieth Century legal 
developments eventually led some scholars to conclude that those rules 
were out-of-date.  In particular, the Supreme Court in International Shoe 
v. Washington overturned Pennoyer and held that a defendant’s physical 
presence in the forum State was no longer a constitutional prerequisite to 
                                                                                                             
26 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1877). 
27 Stonite, 315 U.S. at 563-65. 
28 Sec. 48 of the Judicial Code of 1911, 28 U.S.C. § 109 (1940). 
29 Act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 552, amended by Act of August 13, 1888, c. 
866, 25 Stat. 433. 
30 Stonite, 315 U.S. at 566; Fourco, 353 U.S. at 229. 
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a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.31  The Court 
held: 
[D]ue process requires . . . that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present 
within the territory of the forum, he have certain 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.32 
As a result of International Shoe, companies became subject to suit 
wherever their products were sold, without any regard to whether they 
regularly conducted business in the forum State.  In light of the Court’s 
decision, some scholars in the 1960s and 1970s began to question what 
they viewed as overly restrictive patent venue rules.  If a company could 
be sued on state-law products-liability claims in any State to which the 
allegedly defective product was shipped, then why could a company that 
made infringing sales in all fifty States only be sued in its home State, or 
a judicial district in which it maintains “a regular and established place of 
business?”33  The patent venue rules seemed all the more anomalous to 
those critics as lower federal courts began to view International Shoe as 
having largely eliminated all due process constraints on the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over large, nationwide corporations, even when the 
lawsuit bears no substantial relationship to the forum State. 
The Federal Circuit in VE Holding appears to have arrived at its 
decision based largely on its belief that patent venue rules were out-of-
date, and only secondarily on the thin evidence that Congress really 
intended to change those rules when it amended the general venue statute 
in 1988.  The decision cited extensive criticism of restrictive patent rules, 
including a claim that “[t]he continued existence of the patent venue 
statute serves only to prolong patent litigation and make it more 
expensive.”34  The court asserted that Congress adopted the 1988 
amendments “in response to pressure from the bar and the courts,”35 
thereby suggesting that Congress altered the language of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c) for the purpose of liberalizing patent venue rules.  However, the 
court provided no citations for that assertion.  To the contrary, all available 
                                                                                                             
31 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
32 Id. at 316 (citations omitted). 
33 See, e.g., Richard Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STANFORD 
L. REV. 551 (1973). 
34 VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1583. 
35 Id. at 1578. 
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evidence suggests that Congress viewed the altered language as a minor 
technical amendment, not a substantial overhaul of patent venue rules.36 
If VE Holding was the product of an era when limits on venue and 
personal jurisdiction were skeptically viewed as unnecessary obstacles to 
efficient and low-cost litigation, then this era appears to have come to an 
end.  Perhaps driven by increased concerns over unfairness to defendants 
caused by excessive forum shopping, the Supreme Court in recent years 
has demonstrated greater willingness to impose limits on personal 
jurisdiction.  This trend is best illustrated by the Court’s decision in 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, which categorically rejected the widespread view 
of many lower courts that large corporations are subject to general 
personal jurisdiction in all 50 States.37  VE Holdings is in considerable 
tension with Daimler and other recent personal jurisdiction case law. 
IV. EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER TC HEARTLAND IN 
DELAWARE RAISES SERIOUS DUE PROCESS CONCERNS 
A.  Due Process Limitations on Exercise of Jurisdiction over Out-
of-State Defendants 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in TC Heartland interprets the federal 
patent venue statute as permitting an out-of-state corporate defendant to 
be hauled into federal court in a district (Delaware) where it arguably fails 
to satisfy the “minimum contacts” required to sustain personal 
jurisdiction.38  The ruling permits a Delaware court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over claims that TC Heartland infringed—on a nationwide 
basis—three patents held by Kraft Foods, even though 98% of those 
claims bear no relationship whatsoever to Delaware.39  Although TC 
Heartland did not raise this due process issue in its certiorari petition, the 
constitutional concerns raised by the case may provide the Supreme Court 
with an additional ground to adopt TC Heartland’s interpretation of the 
patent venue statute. 
When considering the Delaware court’s personal jurisdiction over TC 
Heartland, it is important to note that Kraft Foods (like most plaintiffs in 
patent infringement litigation) asserts personal jurisdiction under state 
law, not federal law.  “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in 
                                                                                                             
36 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 66 (1988) (characterizing the amendment to 
§ 1391(c) as one of a series of miscellaneous provisions dealing with relatively minor 
discrete proposals). 
37 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
38 In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
39 Id. at 1343-44. 
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determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.”40  The 
Delaware court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the claims against 
TC Heartland if, and only if, it is permitted to do so under the Delaware 
long-arm statute.41 
In appropriate circumstances, federal law may supplement state law in 
authorizing a federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.42 
Furthermore, there is a federal statute43 that grants limited authorization 
for federal district courts to exercise jurisdiction over defendants charged 
with patent infringement.  However, Kraft has no plausible claim that the 
Delaware federal district court may assert personal jurisdiction over TC 
Heartland on the basis of the federal statute.44 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes strict 
limits on the authority of a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
out-of-state defendants.45  Those limitations serve both to protect litigants 
from inconvenient or distant litigation, and to recognize limits on the 
sovereignty of each State with respect to affairs arising in other States.46 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a state court may not 
exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant simply 
because the defendant has engaged in continuous and systematic activities 
within the State.  Rather, personal jurisdiction also requires a showing that 
the defendant’s in-state activities are sufficiently connected to the 
plaintiff’s claim.47  As Daimler explained, personal jurisdiction may not 
be exercised over nonresident defendants based on claims “having nothing 
                                                                                                             
40 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). 
41 Given the breadth of the Delaware long-arm statute, the personal-jurisdiction analysis 
is essentially a due process analysis. Under that statute, Delaware state courts (and, 
accordingly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware) may exercise personal 
jurisdiction on virtually any basis not inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution. For example, 
the statute authorizes state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident 
who, inter alia, “Transacts any business or performs any character of work or services in 
the State,” “Contracts to supply services or things in this State,” or “Causes tortious injury 
in the State by an act or omission in this State.” 10 Del. C. § 3104(c). 
42 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). 
43 28 U.S.C. § 1694. 
44 Section 1694 provides that “a patent infringement action [may be] commenced in a 
district where the defendant is not a resident but has a regular and established place of 
business” and that service of process may be made upon the defendant’s “agent or agents 
conducting such business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1694. But Kraft has never attempted to rely on that 
jurisdictional provision, nor could it because TC Heartland does not have “a regular and 
established place of business” in Delaware. 
45 See, e.g., J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011) (plurality) 
(“[T]hose who live or operate primarily outside a State have a due process right not to be 
subjected to judgment in its courts as a general matter.”). 
46 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). 
47 See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757. 
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to do with anything that occurred or had its principal impact in” the forum 
State.48 
In addition, a defendant is generally required to answer any and all 
claims asserted in its “home” jurisdiction, even if the claim bears no 
relationship to the jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court refers to an assertion 
of personal jurisdiction where the defendant is “at home” as an exercise of 
“general jurisdiction.”49  Daimler made plain, however, that an assertion 
of general jurisdiction over a corporation can be sustained in only two 
places: the State in which a corporation maintains its principal place of 
business and the State of incorporation.50  In Daimler, the Court found the 
plaintiffs’ request for approval of “the exercise of general jurisdiction in 
every State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, 
and systematic course of business,” to be “too grasping.”51  When a patent 
infringement lawsuit is filed outside the defendant’s “home” jurisdiction, 
a federal district court seeking to exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant with respect to each of the patent-infringement claims asserted 
by the patentee must do so on the basis of “specific jurisdiction.”52 
B.  Most of Kraft’s Claims Are Unrelated to TC Heartland’s 
Contacts with Delaware 
It is undisputed that TC Heartland is not subject to general jurisdiction 
in Delaware.  It is not incorporated in Delaware, nor does it maintain its 
principal place of business in the State.  Therefore, for the Delaware 
district court to properly exercise personal jurisdiction over TC Heartland 
with respect to each of the patent infringement claims asserted by Kraft, it 
must do so on the basis of “specific jurisdiction”—that is, a showing that 
each claim “arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum.”53 
Importantly, only those forum contacts that are directly related to the 
plaintiff’s claims are relevant to the due process determination.54  Kraft 
can demonstrate the requisite minimum contacts with respect to its claims 
that TC Heartland shipped infringing products to Delaware.  While those 
shipments were relatively small and amounted to less than 2% of TC 
Heartland’s total sales of the infringing product, the Delaware shipments 
                                                                                                             
48 Id. at 762. 
49 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 
50 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. 
51 Id. at 760-61. 
52 Id. at 754. 
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (for a court to exercise 
personal jurisdiction consistent with due process, “the defendant’s suit-related conduct 
must create a substantial connection with the forum State”) (emphasis added). 
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establish a “substantial connection” between Delaware and the alleged 
patent infringement.  Those claims are adequate to allege that TC 
Heartland “deliver[ed] its products into the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that they [would] be purchased by consumers in the forum 
State.”55 
However, the complaint is not limited to claims based on allegedly 
infringing acts with a connection to Delaware.  Kraft further alleges that 
TC Heartland infringed its patents by manufacturing products in Indiana 
and selling them in States other than Delaware.56  Those claims—which 
encompass more than 98% of TC Heartland’s allegedly infringing sales—
bear no relationship to Delaware.  Accordingly, specific jurisdiction 
cannot serve as a justification for the district court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over those claims.  Although TC Heartland does in fact have 
some contacts with Delaware, these contacts cannot justify an expansive 
exercise of specific jurisdiction because they bear no relationship to the 
specific claims at issue—that TC Heartland infringed the patent by 
manufacturing patented products and by selling them in States other than 
Delaware. 
In the field of patent law, courts have long understood that each 
alleged infringement of a patent gives rise to a separate cause of action.57  
While a claim that a defendant sold an infringing product in California 
may raise one or more issues of fact that are common to issues of fact 
raised by a claim that the defendant also sold an infringing product in 
Delaware, they remain separate causes of action for which the plaintiff 
will need to submit separate evidence.  Specific jurisdiction is limited to 
claims for which the defendant’s forum contacts “gave rise to the liabilities 
sued on.”58  Because TC Heartland’s contacts with Delaware quite clearly 
did not “g[i]ve rise to” the claims alleging that TC Heartland 
manufactured and sold infringing products outside of Delaware, there is 
no justification for the district court to exercise “specific jurisdiction” over 
those out-of-state claims. 
The Federal Circuit relied on its 1994 Beverly Hills Fan decision in 
finding that TC Heartland’s small number of product shipments to 
Delaware sufficed to establish personal jurisdiction over TC Heartland 
with respect to infringement claims arising in the other forty-nine States 
and lacking any connection with Delaware.59  However, that decision is a 
relic of the pre-Daimler era, in which many federal courts of appeals 
                                                                                                             
55 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980). 
56 In re Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d at 1340. 
57 See Hazelquist v. Guchi Moochie Tackle Co., Inc., 437 F.3d 1178, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
58 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754. 
59 In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d at 1344. 
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permitted large corporations to be sued in any State where they maintained 
a substantial presence. 
Beverly Hills Fan concluded that nationwide jurisdiction over patent-
infringement claims (in any district in which alleged infringement 
occurred) was warranted because it would “provid[e] a forum for 
efficiently litigating plaintiff’s cause of action.”60  However, the Supreme 
Court has never allowed efficiency considerations to trump due process 
constraints on the exercise of personal jurisdiction.  Those constraints 
impose firm limits on the authority of courts to exercise jurisdiction over 
claims and defendants that lack a sufficient connection to the forum: 
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no 
inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the 
tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a 
strong interest in applying its laws to the controversy; 
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for 
litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument 
of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the 
State of its power to render a valid judgment.61 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s decision overlooks the possibility that 
there will always be some jurisdiction—perhaps multiple jurisdictions—
in which a patentee can sue an alleged infringer for all infringing activity 
without regard to where it occurred.  Daimler makes clear that a corporate 
defendant will be subject to general jurisdiction in both its State of 
incorporation, and the State in which it maintains its principal place of 
business.62  Furthermore, Congress has established personal jurisdiction—
for patent-infringement claims arising anywhere in the United States—in 
any district in which the defendant “is not a resident but has a regular and 
established place of business.”63 
The Federal Circuit has interpreted the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(b), as authorizing the filing of a nationwide patent infringement 
lawsuit in any judicial district in which infringing sales occurred (i.e., 
anywhere in the United States, when the corporate defendant sells its 
products on a nationwide basis).64  However, even under the broadest 
possible construction of the statute that (according to the Federal Circuit) 
defines where a corporation “resides” for purposes of § 1400(b),65 
residence (and thus, venue) extends only to judicial districts in which the 
                                                                                                             
60 Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1568. 
61 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294. 
62 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. 
63 28 U.S.C. § 1694. 
64 In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d at 1343-45. 
65 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). 
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defendant “is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the 
civil action in question.”66 Thus, the broad corporate-residence rules 
created by the general venue statute can plausibly be interpreted to be 
inapplicable to the patent venue statute for the additional reason that 
applying them to § 1400(b) (in the manner prescribed by Beverly Hills 
Fan) would arguably create venue in judicial districts in which the district 
court would lack nationwide personal jurisdiction over the alleged 
infringer. 
The Supreme Court can avoid the due process concerns outlined above 
by adopting the more limited interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) urged 
by TC Heartland and accepted by Fourco.  Under this interpretation, a 
corporation “resides” only in the district in which it is incorporated.  This 
means that venue is appropriate in the district in which the alleged 
infringer is incorporated, or in any district in which it has committed acts 
of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.  
Establishing venue in the district in which the defendant is incorporated is 
consistent with the due process limits on general jurisdiction established 
by Daimler.  Furthermore, establishing venue in a district in which the 
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
established place of business, is both consistent with due process and 
authorized by the federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1694, governing the 
distribution of cases within the unified federal court system. 
C.  Congress May Wish to Amend § 1400(b) to Promote Efficiency 
In construing the meaning of § 1400(b), the Supreme Court has two 
options.  It can re-affirm Fourco’s narrow reading of patent venue rules, 
or it can uphold the Federal Circuit’s far broader reading.  For the reasons 
outlined above, the Fourco reading is the preferred outcome, in large part 
because it is the only outcome that does not raise serious constitutional 
concerns. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the patent venue rules established 
by Fourco are fair and efficient under all circumstances.  Some patent 
owners may indeed have legitimate concerns that the Fourco rules could 
create serious difficulties for plaintiffs seeking to defend their patent rights 
in federal court.  For that reason, Congress may be wise to take a fresh 
look at the patent venue issue regardless of how the Supreme Court 
decides the TC Heartland case.67 
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Regardless of SCOTUS Decision in TC Heartland, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 16, 2017), www.ip
watchdog.com/2017/02/16/hatch-venue-reform-likely-scotus-tc-heartland/id=78495/. 
58 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:45 
In particular, under the Fourco rules patent owners seeking to file suit 
simultaneously against multiple infringers may have great difficulty in 
finding a single forum in which to file a nationwide infringement action 
against all defendants.  The Fourco rules ensure that there will be at least 
one forum (and likely multiple forums) within which to sue a single 
defendant.  However, if there is no single forum in which venue is proper 
for all defendants, the plaintiff might be required to file multiple suits.  
Filing multiple suits is rarely an attractive option for a patent owner; 
multiple patent lawsuits are not only expensive, but they also increase the 
risk that at least one federal court will declare the patent invalid. 
This issue may be particularly problematic for owners of 
pharmaceutical patents.  The Hatch-Waxman Act68 provides potential 
generic-drug competitors with lucrative incentives to file applications with 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that essentially force the 
patentee to file a patent infringement lawsuit against the applicants.69  If a 
patented drug has substantial sales, it is highly likely that multiple generic 
drug companies will file FDA applications, thereby requiring the patentee 
to file infringement claims against each of them.  If there is no single forum 
in which all generic companies can be sued under the Fourco venue rules, 
the patentee could be forced to defend its patent by filing multiple 
infringement suits simultaneously. 
If Congress were to determine that the patent venue statute needed to 
be tweaked to prevent such difficulties from arising, it would have little 
difficulty in drafting a legislative fix that would conform to due process 
requirements.  For example, such proposed legislation could decree that 
venue is proper in the Districts of Maryland and the District of Columbia 
(where FDA is located) for any infringement lawsuit prompted by FDA 
filings.  It could then amend 28 U.S.C. § 1694 to grant the two federal 
district courts the authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over patent-
infringement defendants in those circumstances.70 
On the other hand, what the Supreme Court should not do is to follow 
the lead of the Federal Circuit; in other words, it should not allow 
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perceived policy preferences to influence its interpretation of the patent 
venue statute.  That statute has been virtually unchanged for 125 years, 
and it has twice been construed authoritatively by the Supreme Court.  If 
the needs of patent litigants suggest that changes in patent venue rules are 
warranted, those changes ought to come from Congress, not the courts. 
V.     CONCLUSION 
While the question presented in TC Heartland focuses solely on the 
proper construction of the patent venue statute,71 the case also implicates 
important personal jurisdiction issues.  The Federal Circuit decision under 
review not only interpreted the patent venue statute broadly, it also very 
broadly construed the authority of federal district courts to exercise 
nationwide personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations that 
maintain few contacts with the forum.  The Federal Circuit’s personal 
jurisdiction ruling conflicts with recent Supreme Court precedent and 
raises serious due process concerns.  The Supreme Court can avoid the 
need to address those concerns by reaffirming its prior, narrow 
interpretation of the patent venue statute: a corporation should be deemed 
to “reside” solely in the State where it is incorporated. 
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